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The assurance of sustainability reports is a relatively new service offered by different providers such as
accounting ﬁrms and consultants. The percentage of sustainability reports assured and the weight of the
four largest accounting ﬁrms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PWC) in this new market are evolving in time. The
purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the role each one of the four major
accounting ﬁrms (Big4) play in this assurance market. Using a generalized linear mixed model in an
international sample, our results conﬁrm that each Big4 accounting ﬁrm leverages its network of
ﬁnancial audit clients to enter the sustainability assurance market. Despite the global context in which
Big4 operate, the choice of a speciﬁc Big4 as assurance provider depends on country level factors. We also
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the industry distribution for each major accounting ﬁrm. These results
suggest a potential competitive advantage for the Big4 to enter the sustainability assurance market when
they are also auditors of the ﬁnancial statements. Our ﬁndings suggest that each Big4 does not act
uniquely at a global level when they assure sustainability reports as there are characteristics in the
geographical environment which affect this market. Additionally, the differences in market share of each
Big4 by industry, may enforce the idea of the connection between ﬁnancial auditor (a market highly
specialized by industry) and the sustainability assuror.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Big4 audit ﬁrms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PWC) are the largest
international professional companies offering audit, assurance, tax,
consulting, advisory, actuarial, corporate ﬁnance, and legal services.
Among them, sustainability assurance refers to the assurance of
sustainability reports (SR). Professional accountants are qualiﬁed
for this service due to their professional standards and because they
are required to follow ethical principles (Peters and Romi, 2014).
At the end of the last century the ﬁnancial auditing market had
to overcome important challenges (Elliott, 1997), which produced
the development of new markets. The American Institute of
Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA) predicted that there were
possibilities for auditors to expand their services, and that they
would have to face many competitors (Marnet et al., 2014). In this
new setting, Big4 accounting ﬁrms had to evaluate the opportunities and threats of conducting other types of assurance. In recent
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years, both the offer of new services (e.g. the assurance of SRs) and
the presence of new agents (certifying ﬁrms and consultants) in the
assurance market are a fact.
There is no information about the fees paid for this service,
because they are disclosed with other non-ﬁnancial services in the
Transparency reports issued by audit ﬁrms (e.g. Deloitte, 2014; EY,
2014; KPMG, 2014; PWC, 2014). Given the lack of evidence about
the economic impact of this market, we approach it considering the
number of companies that assure of their SRs (Aravind and
Christmann, 2011). The percentage of SRs assured and the weight
of the Big4 in this new market are evolving in time. Mock et al.
(2013) reported that the percentage of SRs assured by Big4
increased from 35.4% in 2002e2004 to 51.35% in 2006e2007. In
addition, KPMG highlights that the market share of the Big4
increased from 60% of the assured SRs in 2005 (KPMG, 2008) to 67%
of the assured SRs in 2013 (KPMG, 2013).
Most of the previous research in sustainability assurance services refers to Big4 as a whole, and considers differences between
them and other assurance providers (Simnett et al., 2009; Hasan
et al., 2005; Perego, 2009). Little is known about the role played
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by each speciﬁc Big4 in this market. Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014)
reported the supremacy of Big4 in assurance of SRs with the
following distribution: KPMG 18%, PWC 19%, Deloitte 10%, and EY,
14%. The lowest percentage of assurance statements issued during
the 2011e2012 period by Deloitte and EY might be explained by the
fact that both of them have their headquarters in New York, and it
has not been until recent years that sustainability became a subject
of matter in the US. On the other hand, KPMG and PWC have their
headquarters in Europe. Europe has been a leader in sustainability
reporting since the European Union released what is known as the
“Europe 2020 Strategy” (European Commission, 2010), a new
model of business based on sustainable growth (Martinuzzi et al.,
2011). In addition, KPMG has been a leader in reporting on sustainability practices since 2008. In fact, sustainability is one of the
main strategies of this audit ﬁrm, which is denoted by the triennial
KPMG surveys of CSR reporting issued since 1993. Cohen and
Simnett (2014) identiﬁed a research gap regarding the market of
sustainability assurance, which we are addressing in this paper.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate if Big4
audit ﬁrms leverage their network of ﬁnancial audit customers to
enter the sustainability assurance market. Second, we study if there
is industry specialization or country differentiation in sustainability
assurance for each speciﬁc Big4 audit ﬁrm. A better understanding
of the role of Big4 in this assurance market will strengthen previous
results providing an insight on this novel market. This approach can
open new venues for future research by comparing both audit and
assurance markets, and understanding the underlying reason for
audit companies to engage on assurance services. It may also be
useful for regulatory bodies to design the policy of this oligopolistic
market mainly dominated by four large ﬁrms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG
and PWC). Our motivation is founded on previous literature, which
assesses the existence of industry specialization (Dunn and
Mayhew, 2004; Carson, 2009; Jaggi et al., 2012) and country differentiation (Verleyen and De Beelde, 2011) among Big4, in the
ﬁnancial auditing market.
The paper proceeds as follows: the background that supports
the development of our hypotheses; the description of the sample
and research methods; the descriptive analysis and the results of
testing our hypotheses, followed by our conclusions and implications for the future.
2. Background and hypotheses development
There are no norms or regulation to guide the contract between
a ﬁrm and an assurance provider. In order to contract the provision
of any assurance service by an audit ﬁrm, both the client has to
make a decision to hire a speciﬁc auditor, and the auditing ﬁrm has
to accept the client. The choice of an assurance provider is a complex process that includes arguments based on economic rationality and arguments based on collective rationality (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983) that can be explained under institutional theory. In a
context of economic rationality, companies will choose a speciﬁc
assurance provider under a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Hence, the selection of an assuror might be inﬂuenced by the fact that it is also
the ﬁnancial auditor. The possibility of having common processes in
both services might allow economies of scope, including the
reduction of time needed to learn about the reporting organization
(Park and Brorson, 2005) or the reduction of fees (Byus et al., 2013).
However, institutional theory implies that companies do not follow
this rational behavior, but instead they emphasize the social
context within which ﬁrms operates (Bansal, 2005). In other words,
a ﬁrm committed to sustainability reporting and assurance might
select the same auditor as assuror because of informal mechanisms
that can reinforce the company's social reputation. Therefore,
regulation and social pressure (Daub, 2007; Alrazi et al., 2015)
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besides marginal returns, might be the underlying reasons for
companies to engage in CSR assurance.
Research in auditing found association between audit and nonaudit fees, which is consistent with knowledge spillovers between
both services (Simunic, 1984; Davis et al., 1993; Craswell and
Francis, 1999). For example, the understanding of the internal
control system is necessary for both, the ﬁnancial audit and the
assurance of the SR process under ISAE3000 (IAASB, 2013, 2014;
AICPA, 2015). In general, providing ﬁnancial audit and assurance
of SR is allowed by regulation; although there is a risk of compromising the independence of the auditor due to the provision of
additional services (Boyd, 2004; Reiter and Williams, 2004). European ﬁrms have limits to provide the joint service depending on
total turnover (European Parliament and the Council, 2014).
Nevertheless, this measure, implemented to safeguard auditor's
independence, has a marginal effect because it is only applied to
speciﬁc situations. Based on these grounds, the provision of
ﬁnancial auditing and SR assurance services simultaneously may
have advantages for suppliers, because of the knowledge acquired
during the ﬁnancial audit process. At the same time, from the demand standpoint, it might be desirable to hire a service supplier
that already knows the company and its procedures. In the Spanish
context, Sierra-García et al. (2013) identiﬁed several marketing
strategies of the Big4's, concluding that Deloitte and EY offer sustainability assurance as additional service to their audit clients
while KPMG get new clients for this new service. We formulate our
ﬁrst hypothesis as follows:
H1. Each Big4 accounting ﬁrm leverages its network of ﬁnancial
audit clients to enter the sustainability assurance market.
The decision to assure the SR can be comprehended under the
institutional theory (Kolk and Perego, 2010; O'Dwyer et al., 2011;
Simnett et al., 2009). This decision, in the context of CSR communication, is not necessarily taken under economic criteria, as
lez (2007) asserted, because of the existence of
Larrinaga-Gonza
structures or mechanisms that make the assurance of SR a process
widely accepted by companies. DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
referred to coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms. Coercive mechanisms include pressure exerted by other organizations
upon which the company is dependent and also by cultural expectations; normative mechanisms arise mainly from shared values
and norms; and mimetic mechanisms stem from uncertainty as a
force that encourages imitation. These mechanisms or processes
may be leading companies in a particular context (country, industry, etc.) to behave in a similar way regarding the choice of the
assurance provider. If an assurance provider is a specialist with a
high reputation in a particular country it is likely that this reputation will lead other companies to hire her. In this situation, it is
expected that every Big4 has its own market in each country
(Francis et al., 2013). However these are global ﬁrms that have incentives to maintain uniform quality around the world (Simunic
and Stein, 1987). United States (US) is a paradigmatic example
due to a low demand of sustainability assurance. From the supply
point of view, Casey and Grenier (2014) evaluated companies in
highly regulated industries in the US (ﬁnance and utilities) where
the oversight by regulators becomes a substitute of CSR assurance.
According to Francis and Wang (2008) the Big4 accounting ﬁrms
are hesitant to offer these services due to an excessive litigation
environment. From the demand point of view, Cho et al. (2014)
found that investors in the US do not value the assurance of CSR
reports. Conversely, Braam et al. (2016) found that in the
Netherlands the process of assurance positively affects the level of
corporate environmental accountability. These authors considered
that The Netherlands has a CSR leadership role, due to the fact that
GRI and Greenpeace are based there. In a detailed analysis of the
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sustainability assurance market, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014)
identiﬁed signiﬁcant differences by country. Using a sample of
2526 sustainability reports with external assurance in 16 countries,
they found that KPMG has the largest market share in Italy and the
Netherlands; PWC in Finland, Germany and South Africa; Deloitte
in Portugal, and EY in Canada and France. They also found that there
is no clear predominance of any of them in Australia, China, Spain
and the US. Kolk and Margineantu (2009) explored if each Big4
adopts a global integration (standardization) or a responsiveness
(adaptation) strategy with respect to their sustainability services.
They found that Big4 ﬁrms follow an adaptation strategy (persistent differences between countries) consistent with country
specialization more than a standardization strategy (no consistency
at the country or region levels). They highlighted that in terms of
visibility, KPMG has preeminence in Europe, Deloitte in North
America, PWC in both North and South America, and EY in Africa.
According to this reasoning, the demand for sustainability assurance should follow differentiated patterns of behavior by country.
Hence, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows:
H2. Ceteris paribus, country determinants affect the sustainability
assurance market share of each Big4 accounting ﬁrm.
Previous research indicates that industry specialization generally leads to expertise and economies of scale. For example, Fung
et al. (2012) found signiﬁcant specialization premiums and scale
discounts due to industry specialization. Industry specialization in
the ﬁnancial audit context is an issue widely analyzed since Zeff
and Fossum's (1967) seminal work (Carson, 2009; Ettredge et al.,
2009; Verleyen and De Beelde, 2011). Hogan and Jeter (1999)
highlighted that audit concentration levels are higher in regulated and concentrated industries, and in those industries experiencing a rapid growth. Specialization by industry offers a
competitive advantage from the supply point of view and provides
an argument for the design of strategies in the sustainability
assurance market (Carson et al., 2004; Casterella et al., 2004). Under the prism of economic rationality, companies select an industry
specialist with the expectation of obtaining a higher quality of
service (Almutairi et al., 2009; Francis, 2004; Lim and Tan, 2010;
Nagy, 2012). Additionally, it is necessary to consider that not all
decisions are taken with an economic rationale and could have an
isomorphic behavior among companies in the same sector due to
institutionalization mechanisms through imitation (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). It is expected that if a particular assurance provider
is a specialist in an industry, companies in that sector will have a
higher propensity to hire it, considering it is a guarantee of quality.
Hence, we formulate our third hypothesis as follows:
H3. Ceteris paribus, industry determinants affect the sustainability
assurance market share of each Big4 accounting ﬁrm.

3. Sample and research methods
3.1. Data selection and sample design
Data were collected from the GRI database for the years
2011e2013 (data retrieved in September 2014). We selected 18
countries (Table 1) that have the largest number of reports submitted to the GRI, and span the whole world except for Asian
countries, due to language limitations in hand collection of data.
The sample includes countries with an economic relevance (e.g.,
US); with a leadership in communication and veriﬁcation of sustainability reports (e.g., Spain); with cultural values towards sustainability (e.g., Sweden and Finland); developing countries (e.g.,
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia); and developed ones (e.g., Germany, Canada and Australia). We hand collected the name of the

assurer for the year 2011. For 2012, 2013, this information is
available in the GRI database. We also hand collected the name of
the ﬁnancial auditor for each company and year, as well as the industry when it was identiﬁed by “others” and “conglomerates” in
the GRI database, removing those for which we did not ﬁnd a
speciﬁc industry. Data were gathered from different sources: the
companies' websites, public databases and contacting with the
ﬁrms. Although the sample of countries has not been selected
randomly, which can compromise generalization of results, we use
generalized linear mixed model because, according to Snijders and
Bosker (2012), if the number of countries is larger than 10, the
mixed model is more parsimonious than the ﬁxed model. Our
sample includes 1378 SRs, from 739 companies, assured by a Big4
or a non-Big4, being the ﬁnancial auditor a Big4 or a non-Big4.

3.2. Analytical models
According to Hox (2002) generalized linear mixed models are
highly recommended in analyzing jointly explanatory variables
referred to different levels when data are nested. We adopt this
methodology because our sample has repeated measures for each
company during the period 2011e2013, and the possible existence
of nested data by country. For that purpose, we create a ﬁrst unconditional model to test the effect of country as random effect in
the response variables. Other explanatory variables are omitted.
The general mathematical expression is (equation (1)):

log


Pr Yij ¼ 1
1  Pr Yij ¼ 1

 ¼ b0j þ εij

(1)

where:Pr (Yij ¼ 1) is the probability of the dependent variable
referred to the ith company in the jth country adopts a value of 1.boj
is the average value of the dependent variable in every country, and
εij is the error or random variation around the average.
To analyze the covariance parameters to verify country as
random effect, we calculate the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient
(ICC) as the variance of the random effect divided by the total
variance. Wald Z statistic indicates the signiﬁcance. If country is a
random effect, generalized linear mixed models are justiﬁed.
In a second step, we introduce different explanatory variables.
We use Big4*-FA to test H1, referred to the effect of each Big4 accounting ﬁrm on the offer of assurance services. Country-level
variables (Common law and EU) are used to test H2, to identify
causes of the differentiation by countries. Finally, we use Industry
to test H3, in order to analyze the specialization by industry. As
control variable, we include Listed, representing if the ﬁrm is
quoted in a stock exchange. We include this variable because listed
companies are usually leaders on reporting practices, due to their
public exposition (Gürtürk and Hahn, 2016). We run the model four
times, one per each Big4. The model is expressed as equation (2):
BIGX*-AP ¼ f (BIGX*-FA, Country, Commonlaw, EU, Industry,
Listed)

(2)

BIGX* is each of the Big4 audit ﬁrm, resulting therefore in four
tests for each model.
Because all the dependent variables are dichotomous, we express the models as binary logistic regressions (equation (3)):


Pr Yij ¼ 1
 ¼ b0j þ b1j X1ij þ … þ bnj Xnij þ εij
Yij ¼ log
Pr Yij ¼ 0

(3)

where:Yij is the response variable in each model. The double index
refers to the ith company in the jth country.X1ij, …, Xnij represent
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Table 1
Sample distribution by country and assurance provider.
Country

KPMG

PWC

Deloitte

EY

Others

Total

% Big4 over total by country

% First Big4 over Total by country

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Mexico
Netherlands
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
UK
US
Total
% over Total

1
7
27
2
4
6
6
22
8
30
3
33
13
14
49
26
8
3
262
19.01

10
6
15
7
2
16
4
45
0
13
13
23
13
17
34
37
15
4
274
19.88

2
8
5
11
12
2
5
2
8
16
12
7
14
9
14
34
5
9
175
12.70

3
18
9
9
0
1
17
4
3
21
3
23
0
13
10
35
13
8
190
13.79

6
60
29
8
8
10
3
27
19
13
19
8
5
37
77
21
36
91
477
34.62

22
99
85
37
26
35
35
100
38
93
50
94
45
90
184
153
77
115
1378
100

72.73
39.39
65.88
78.38
69.23
71.43
91.43
73.00
50.00
86.02
62.00
91.49
88.89
58.89
58.15
86.27
53.25
20.87
65.38

45.45
18.18
31.76
29.73
46.15
45.71
48.57
45.00
21.05
32.26
26.00
35.11
31.11
18.89
26.63
24.18
19.48
7.83
19.88

the n explanatory variables at the company level.εij represents the
error or random variation around the average.
The parameters boj, b1j, …bnj (equation (4)) are variables with
values that may vary from one country to another

b0j ¼ g00 þg01 Z1j þ…g0m Zmj þU0j
b1j ¼ g11 þg11 Z1j þ…g1m Zmj þU1j
…

(4)

bnj ¼ gn0 þgn1 Z1j þ…gnm Zmj þUnj
where:g00, …, gnm are ﬁxed coefﬁcients.Z1ij, …, Zmij represent the m
explanatory variables at the country level.U0j, …, Unj represents the
variability of the means of the dependent variables in the different
countries with respect to the global variability.
3.3. Variable description
3.3.1. Dependent variables
KPMG-AP adopts a value of 1 if the company hires KPMG as
assurance provider of its SR, 0 otherwise.
PWC-AP adopts a value of 1 if the company hires PWC as
assurance provider of its SR, 0 otherwise.
DEL-AP adopts a value of 1 if the company hires Deloitte as
assurance provider of its SR, 0 otherwise.
EY-AP adopts a value of 1 if the company hires EY as assurance
provider of its SR, 0 otherwise.
3.3.2. Explanatory variables
KPMG-FA adopts a value of 1 if the company hires KPMG as
auditor of its ﬁnancial statements, 0 otherwise.
PWC-FA adopts a value of 1 if the company hires PWC as auditor
of its ﬁnancial statements, 0 otherwise.
DEL-FA adopts a value of 1 if the company hires Deloitte as
auditor of its ﬁnancial statements, 0 otherwise.
EY-FA adopts a value of 1 if the company hires EY as auditor of its
ﬁnancial statements, 0 otherwise.
Country. Reporting practices vary across countries due to
different cultural and social norms or governmental regulations
nchez, 2010; Golob and Bartlett, 2007; Hahn and
(Sotorrío and Sa
Kühnen, 2013). This variable is used as random effect in all the
models. It adopts 18 values, according to the 18 countries in our
sample.
To further analyze the country effect on the response variable,

we introduce the following variables at the country level:
Commonlaw
According to LaPorta et al. (1997), historical background and
legal system can be used to classify countries into common law and
civil law legal tradition, being the ﬁrst linked to stronger investor
protection than the second. Sustainability assurance demand differs by country depending on their legal system (Kolk and Perego,
2010; Simnett et al., 2009). This variable adopts a value of 1 for
Canada, Australia, South Africa, UK and US, and a value of 0 for the
remaining countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Finland France,
Germany Greece, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden).
EU
According to Kolk and Margineantu (2009), there is a strong
local adaptation more than standardization in sustainability services offered by Big4. Europe is a reference region due to its policies
towards sustainability (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014). This variable
adopts a value of 1 if the company is in Europe and 0 otherwise.
At the company-year level we introduce the following variables:
Industry
It is deﬁned following Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2015). It adopts a
value of 1 if the company belongs to Energy (Chemical, Energy and
Energy utilities); 2 if Construction (Construction and Construction
materials); 3 if Services (Commercial services, Healthcare services,
Media, Non-proﬁt services, Public agency, Real estate, Tourism,
Universities, Waste management and Water utilities); 4 if Transportation (Aviation, Logistic, Railroad); 5 if Primary sector (Agriculture, Forest and paper products and Mining); 6 if Manufacturing
(Automotive, Equipment, Metal products, Textiles and Apparel, and
Tobacco); 7 if Technology (Computers, Technology hardware,
Telecommunications); 8 if Consumer goods (Consumer durables,
Food and Beverages, Health care products, Household and personal
products and Retailers); 9 if Financial services. To facilitate the
interpretation of the results, we ﬁrst identify the less signiﬁcant
industry in each Big4 as value of reference. Thus, Manufacturing is
the reference in testing KPMG and EY and Consumer goods is the
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reference for PWC and Deloitte.
Listed is a variable included to control for the effect of the
pressure of investors. It adopts a value of 1 if the company is listed
and 0 otherwise.
We use a variable Year, not as an explanatory variable, but as
part of the structure of the model due to the repeated measures for
each company.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The distribution of the sample according to the assurance provider and the country is broken down in Table 1. We aggregated
more than 50 different assurors into “Others”. Some of these providers work on speciﬁc countries, identiﬁed by importance in parentheses, i.e. Aenor (Spain), Bureau Veritas (US, Brazil, Spain, UK,
Canada, Colombia and France), DNV (Brazil, US, Italy, Sweden,
Germany, Greece, UK), ERM (US, South Africa, UK, Australia, Germany, Spain), Net Balance1 (Australia, Germany), SGS (Spain, UK).
Due to its heterogeneous nature, we do not use Others-AP as
dependent variable. Big4 have a market share of 65.38% in the
sustainability assurance services, and KPMG and PWC stand out,
with a percentage of 19.01% and 19.88%, respectively. The cross
tabulation analysis between country and assurance providers
shows
a
signiﬁcant
correlation
(Pearson
Chi-Square
value ¼ 515.700 and Asymp Sig. ¼ 0.000). Table 1 indicates that
Big-4 have the highest market share in the majority of the countries
analyzed, meanwhile non-Big4 providers (Others) have the highest
market share only in Australia and the US, with large differences
respect to the second provider. Interestingly, in every country the
Big 4 with the highest market share has close to 50% of the total
market, being the average 19.88%, and the lowest market share of
the Big4 in US.
4.2. Test of hypotheses
As a ﬁrst step we test the country effect. We run 4 generalized
linear mixed models, one for each Big4, with country as random
effect but no ﬁxed factors. This analysis allows us to determine the
odds of choosing a speciﬁc Big4 as assurance provider, using
country as random effect. Table 2 shows signiﬁcant high values for
the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient (ICC), which indicates the
percentage of variability of the dependent variable due to country
level determinants. 35.82% of the variability in choosing KPMG as
assurance provider is explained by country level factors, 43.45% for
PWC, 40.14% for Deloitte and 47.63% for EY. Notwithstanding the
global context in which Big4 operates, we ﬁnd that the country in
which the company operates affects the sustainability assurance
market share of every Big4.
As a second step we introduce in the model a variable indicating
the corresponding ﬁnancial auditor, Commonlaw, EU, Industry and
Listed. Table 3 displays the statistical coefﬁcients and signiﬁcances
of the different values of each variable.
The results suggest that the likelihood of choosing a given Big4
as assurance provider is positive and signiﬁcantly associated to the
fact that the same Big4 is also the ﬁnancial auditor (p-

1

Subsequently to our data analysis, in 2014, Net Balance was acquired by EY
Australia. Worth mentioning that in Australia there is a dominance of a local
consultancy ﬁrm and one of the Big4 is the ﬁrst Big4 in terms of market share with
a signiﬁcant difference respect to the second ﬁrm. It opens a possible new stage in
the evolution of this market with the acquisitions of local consultancy ﬁrms by any
Big4 which dominates the market. That could be the case of KPMG in South Africa,
Spain or UK, where a non-Big4 ﬁrm has an important market share.

value ¼ 0.000). The exponential coefﬁcient indicates that the odds
of choosing KPMG as assurance provider of the SR is 0.079 times
lower in companies where KPMG is not the ﬁnancial auditor than in
companies where KPMG is the ﬁnancial auditor. For PWC, the odds
ratio is 0.096; for Deloitte is 0.054 and for EY is 0.058.
According to this result, each Big4 accounting ﬁrm leverages its
network of ﬁnancial audit clients to enter the sustainability assurance market, supporting our ﬁrst hypothesis. The ﬁrst analysis,
using the unconditional model (Table 2), conﬁrms a signiﬁcant effect of country in the sustainability assurance market share of every
Big4, supporting our second hypothesis. In order to explain the
source of this diversity, we test the effect of country-level determinants in each Big4. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association (at the
95% level) in the KPMG model. The odds of choosing KPMG as
assurance provider of the SR, is 3.081 times higher in companies
located in civil law than in companies located in common law
countries (p-value ¼ 0.008). We also test differences between EU
countries and others and ﬁnd that the odds of choosing KPMG as
assurance provider of the SR is 0.402 times lower in companies
located in non EU countries than in companies located in EU
countries (p-value ¼ 0.017).
To further analyze these results, we create the variable Commonlaw by LegalSystem. This variable considers 4 values: 1 if it
belongs to German civil law (Germany), 2 if French civil law
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico, The
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain); 3 if Scandinavian civil law
(Finland and Sweden) and 4 if English common law (Australia,
Canada, SouthAfrica, UK and US), according to LaPorta et al. (1997).
Non-tabulated results indicate that the likelihood of choosing
KPMG as assurance provider is 3.300 times higher in companies
located in French civil law than in companies in English legal system (p-value ¼ 0.005). The effects of the remaining variables are
nearly identical to the reported model. We do not ﬁnd any significant association for PWC, Deloitte and EY.
Regarding the specialization by industries, Table 3 shows a
signiﬁcant association between each Big4 and industry. This association has to be described considering the industry used as reference, which was selected because it was the less representative. It is
important to highlight that we control for the effect of each Big4
being the ﬁnancial auditor in the company. The odds of choosing
KPMG as assurance provider of the SR is higher in companies
belonging to the Energy and chemicals (2.385 times), Construction
(2.522 times), Transportation (3.548 times), Primary sector (2.806
times), Consumer goods (2.353 times) and Financial services (2.671
times) industries than in companies in Manufacturing (p-

Table 2
Country effect (Unconditional model).

BICa
Accuracy
Covariance parameters
Random effect (country)
Residual effect
ICC (%)

BICa
Accurate
Covariance parameters
Random effect (country)
Residual effect
ICC (%)
a

Unconditional-Model
(KPMG-AP)

Unconditional-Model
(PWC-AP)

6659.344
81.0%
Estimate Z
Sig.
0.528
2.281
0.023
0.946
26.072 0.000
35.82

6639.927
80.1%
Estimate Z
Sig.
0.726
2.277
0.023
0.945
26.048 0.000
43.45

Unconditional-Model
(DEL-AP)

Unconditional-Model
(EY-AP)

7119.348
87.3%
Estimate Z
Sig.
0.631
2.322
0.020
0.941
26.074 0.000
40.14

7064.741
86.2%
Estimate Z
Sig.
0.843
2.221
0.026
0.927
26.055 0.000
47.63

BIC is Bayesian Information Criterion, based on 2 log pseudo likelihood.
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Table 3
Fixed coefﬁcients in our model.
Model (KPMG-AP)

Model (PWC-AP)

BICa
Accuracy
Model term
Intercept
KPMG-FA (value ¼ 0)
PWC-FA (value ¼ 0)
Common Law (Civil law)
EU (non EU)
Industry (Ener. and Chem.)
Industry (Construction)
Industry (Services)
Industry (Transportation)
Industry (Primary sector)
Industry (Manufacturing)
Industry (Technology)
Industry (Consumer goods)
Industry (Financial services)
Listed (no listed)

7278.214
85.9%
t
2.090
14.539
e
2.655
2.386
2.329
2.160
0.516
2.757
2.350
0.000a
1.672
2.030
2.662
2.458

7342.971
85.0%
t
1.778
e
13.588
1.596
-0.427
1.140
2.383
0.423
1.054
2.563
2.116
1.258
0.000a
1.689
0.209

Model (DEL-AP)

Model (EY-AP)

BICa
Accuracy
Model term
Intercept
DEL-FA (value ¼ 0)
EY-FA (value ¼ 0)
Common Law (Civil law)
EU (non EU)
Industry (Ener. and Chem.)
Industry (Construction)
Industry (Services)
Industry (Transportation)
Industry (Primary sector)
Industry (Manufacturing)
Industry (Technology)
Industry (Consumer goods)
Industry (Financial services)
Listed (no listed)

7917.024
88.8%
t
2.765
14.976
e
0.937
1.128
2.910
1.731
1.852
2.427
0.474
1.243
0.699
0.000a
3.051
1.324

7969.869
89.7%
t
-0.648
e
14.336
1.397
1.124
2.480
1.515
2.547
2.314
1.716
0.000a
3.754
1.139
2.691
1.099

Sig.
0.037
0.000
e
0.008
0.017
0.020
0.031
0.606
0.006
0.019

Exp(Coeff)
0.326
0.079
e
3.081
0.402
2.385
2.522
1.231
3.548
2.806

0.095
0.043
0.008
0.014

2.117
2.353
2.671
0.630

Sig.
0.006
0.000
e
0.349
0.260
0.004
0.084
0.064
0.015
0.636
0.214
0.485

Exp(Coeff)
0.135
0.054
e
1.749
1.845
3.437
2.268
2.247
3.303
1.273
1.968
1.419

0.002
0.186

3.642
1.305

Sig.
0.076
e
0.000
0.111
0.670
0.254
0.017
0.672
0.292
0.010
0.035
0.209

Exp(Coeff)
0.301
e
0.096
2.557
0.797
1.506
2.755
1.173
1.589
2.794
2.367
1.714

0.091
0.835

1.834
1.041

Sig.
0.517
e
0.000
0.163
0.261
0.013
0.130
0.011
0.021
0.086

Exp(Coeff)
0.569
e
0.058
0.395
0.498
4.019
2.662
4.443
4.480
2.998

0.000
0.255
0.007
0.272

9.493
2.013
4.710
0.771

Bold values are statistically signiﬁcant.
a
This coefﬁcient is set to zero because it is redundant.

values ¼ 0.020, 0.031, 0.006, 0.019, 0.043 and 0.008, respectively).
This association is remarkable in the Transportation industry
(Fig. 1).
The odds of choosing PWC as assurance provider is statistically
higher in companies belonging to Construction (2.755 times), the
Primary sector (2.794 times) and Manufacturing (2.367 times), than
in companies in the Consumer goods industry (p-values ¼ 0.017,
0.010, and 0.035, respectively) (Fig. 2).
Regarding the industry distribution for Deloitte (Fig. 3), the odds
of choosing Deloitte as assurance provider is signiﬁcantly higher in
companies belonging to Energy and chemicals (3.437 times),
Transportation (3.303 times) and Financial Services (3.642 times)
than in companies in the Consumer goods sector (p-values ¼ 0.004,
0.015, and 0.002, respectively).
The odds of choosing EY as assurance provider is signiﬁcantly
higher in companies belonging to the Energy and chemicals (4.019
times), Services (4.443 times), Transportation (4.480 times), Technology (9.493 times) and Financial services industry (4.710 times)
than in the Manufacturing sector (p-values ¼ 0.013, 0.011, 0.21,
0.000 and 0.007, respectively). As depicted in Fig. 4, there is a spike
in the Technology industry.
These results conﬁrm the variability of the market share of each
Big4 accounting ﬁrm depending on the industry membership of the
company assured, which supports the third hypothesis.
Finally, regarding the Listed control variable, we ﬁnd it signiﬁcant only for KPMG. The likelihood of choosing KPMG as assurance

provider of the SR is higher in listed companies (p-value ¼ 0.035).
The odds of choosing KPMG is 0.677 times lower in non-listed
companies than in listed companies.
5. Discussion
Our results indicate that Big4 ﬁrms ﬁnd an opportunity in
providing assurance services to their ﬁnancial auditing clients.
From the companies' point of view, the rationale might be an
economic criterion: the existence of common processes in both
services that allows a reduction of fees. On the side of the provider,
the explanation could be based on the marketing strategy of the
audit ﬁrm: offering sustainability assurance to their audit clients
might foster their loyalty and add entrance barriers to other suppliers. This result might also be a starting point for future research
regarding the consequences of the high concentration in this
market and how the accounting profession should deal with the
possible conﬂicts of interest.
Regarding the country or industry differentiations in sustainability assurance among Big4 ﬁrms, our results conﬁrm the significant weight of country level factors to explain the choice of a
speciﬁc Big4 as assurance provider. Audit ﬁrms are not equally
distributed along the different countries, and the country in which
the company is located affects the sustainability assurance market
share of every Big4. Our results conﬁrm the preeminence of KPMG
in Europe as in Kolk and Margineantu (2009) and Fernandez-Feijoo
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Fig. 1. Distribution by industry in KPMG.

Fig. 2. Distribution by industry in PWC.

et al. (2014). We ﬁnd that Big4 has a low market share in US as
Casey and Grenier (2014). PWC leads the sustainability assurance
market in Argentina, Finland and Germany; Deloitte in Colombia;
and EY in France. Hence, our results support the existence of a
country differentiation regarding the assurance service. We further
investigate if legal system tradition or being part of the EU affects
the market share of the each Big4. Both variables are only signiﬁcant for KPMG. This fact that can be explained by the high visibility
of this ﬁrm in Europe (Kolk and Margineantu, 2009) and its public
commitment towards sustainability. Thus, there are other country
variables, yet to be investigated, that could explain the choice of
Deloitte, EY or PWC as assurer providers.
Regarding industry, our results show signiﬁcant differences in

the industry distribution for each Big 4 after controlling for other
factors. There is a predominance of KPMG in Transportation, PWC
in Construction and Primary sector, Deloitte in Financial services
and Transportation, and ﬁnally EY in Technology. Most of the sectors are highly regulated industries, with a high level of concentration and a rapid growth, which are the characteristics that Hogan
and Jeter (1999) link to high levels of audit concentration.
Finally, regarding the effect of the variable Listed, representing
the pressure of investors, it has only signiﬁcance for KPMG.
6. Conclusions
This study explored the relationship between the main global
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Fig. 3. Distribution by industry in Deloitte.

Fig. 4. EY by industry.

accounting ﬁrms acting as ﬁnancial auditors and their role as assurers of SR. The novelty of our approach is that we analyze each
one of the known as Big4 individually. Given that these ﬁrms
operate all over the world, certain global homogeneity in the
functioning of each accounting ﬁrm might be expected. As an initial
step, we investigate if Big4 audit ﬁrms leverage their network of
ﬁnancial audit customers to enter the sustainability assurance
market. We ﬁnd that they do. We believe that there is a potential
competitive advantage. The Big4 ﬁrms can deﬁne a generic strategy
to approach their clients with other services (e.g. assurance of the
SR) linked to the auditing service.
Our ﬁndings suggest that each Big4 does not behave uniformly

at a global level when they assure SRs as could be predicted. There
are characteristics at a country level affecting this market. Additionally, the strengths of cultural factors overcoming the expected
homogeneity of the Big4 should be assessed. It seems that the
major accounting ﬁrms should consider this local differences when
designing their strategies, when consolidating their country position and also when penetrating new markets. In sum, more
attention should be paid to those factors that conform the speciﬁc
characteristics of a country. The observed differences in market
share by industry may enforce the idea of the connection between
ﬁnancial auditor (a market highly specialized by industry) and the
sustainability assuror. Our results are signing towards a
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specialization of assurance providers by industry. This specialization, signiﬁcant by itself, and inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial auditing
specialization, is prompted by a possible client capture.
This paper has implications for practitioners and regulators
since it provides evidence of the existence of a relationship between providers of ﬁnancial and sustainability assurance. It also
indicates speciﬁcally the market of each Big4 in the assurance of
sustainability reports market. Future research should look into the
ﬁnancial audit market to verify if the specialization observed in the
assurance market overlaps with the ﬁnancial auditing market. New
explanatory variables help understand the effect of country in the
market share of each Big4, providing more knowledge on the
behavior of these audit ﬁrms.
Our results are subject to limitations because the sample was
collected from GRI database, and might be biased due to the
companies' decision to report to GRI. Additionally, the selection of
countries might inﬂuence the results. More research is needed to
overcome these limitations.
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